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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID W. GLASSCOCK, 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 950050-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, BOARD OF PARDONS : Category No. 3 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (g) 
(1994) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. David W. Glasscock has not marshaled the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact and this Court should 
therefore assume that the record supports such findings and affirm 
the same. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court should survey the record in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's findings of fact and 
only reverse if there is no reasonable basis therein to support the 
trial court's findings. Northern v. Barnes, 870 P.2d 914, 915 
(Utah 1994) . 
2. Petitioner has raised the question of the constitutionality of 
Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme for the first time on 
appeal. This Court should refuse to consider this claim for the 
first time on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because this issue was not raised in the 
lower court, there is no lower court decision to review on this 
issue-determine whether or not to grant petitioner credit for time 
served prior to conviction. 
3. The Board of Pardon's decisions concerning petitioner were not 
arbitrary or capricious. The Board was acting in accordance with 
its authority when it gave the petitioner a rehearing date, and the 
Board is not bound by the sentencing guidelines. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue presents only a question of 
law which this Court reviews for correctness giving no deference to 
the trial court. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945 
(Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such materials are to be found in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
David W. Glasscock, an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison, filed this action for an extraordinary writ alleging that 
the Board of Pardons had no authority to give him a rehearing date 
instead of a parole date. R. 7-8. Petitioner also claims that the 
Board of Pardons, that looks with disfavor upon inmates who 
continue to deny the criminal wrongdoing according to the 
petitioner, thereby prevented him from presenting evidence to show 
Mr. Glasscock's innocence for fear he would be determined to be in 
denial and given a longer sentence. The respondent, State of Utah, 
Board of Pardons, filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief. R. 42-59. The writ was heard on 
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November 18, 1994 by the trial court, R. 64. Petitioner's Notice 
of Appeal was filed with the trial court on December 1, 1994. R. 
65. Judge Brian's Findings of Fact# Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Order was entered on December 2, 1994. R. 68-71. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
David Glasscock has not sought to marshal any of the evidence, 
either that supporting the trial court's findings of fact, or that 
contrary to the trial court's findings. For this reason, the 
respondent-appellee submits the following Findings of Fact as 
entered by the trial court on December 2, 1994 as its statement of 
relevant facts. A copy of the trial court's Findings, Conclusions 
and Final Order is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
Findings of Fact 
1. On or about July 29, 1991, petitioner entered a plea ui 
guilty to the offense of sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced 
by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to serve not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
2. Petitioner's sentence and conviction have not been 
reversed or vacated of (sic) appeal. 
3. On June 24, 1992, the Board held petitioner's original 
parole grant hearing at which time the Board set a rehearing date 
of November, 1994. 
4. On June 24, 1992, the Board entered its rationale for its 
decision which weighed the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating circumstances and determined that an alienist report 
would be due prior to the rehearing date. 
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5. On February 14, 1994, the Board responded to inquiries 
made by petitioner as to the reasons for its decision of June 24, 
1992. 
6. The Board, in part, justified its decision on the victim's 
age and the violent nature of the offense, petitioner's 
relationship to the victim, his denial of the offense, and the lack 
of sex therapy while at the Utah State Prison. The Board also 
questioned family support and petitioner's prior arrest conviction 
and supervision history. 
7. A rehearing was held on November 4, 1994 to consider 
whether petitioner should be granted a parole date. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Board took the matter under 
advisement. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
David W. Glasscock is serving a one-to-fifteen year sentence. 
Petitioner presents several vague challenges to the Board of 
Pardons decisions concerning his eligibility for parole, including 
some that were not raised in the trial court. 
Having failed to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's findings, Glasscock cannot challenge the same and this 
Court should assume that the findings are supported by the record. 
The Board of Pardon's decisions on how much time the 
petitioner must serve on his sentence has not been arbitrary or 
capricious and the petitioner's writ was therefore properly 
denied. 
Glasscock's claim that Utah's indeterminate sentencing 
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statutes are unconstitutional was not raised in the trial court and 
should not be heard, for the first time, on appeal. 
The Utah Board of Pardons did not abuse its discretion when it 
gave Mr. Glasscock a rehearing date instead of a parole date at his 
original parole grant hearing. As long as the decision of the Utah 
Board of Pardons as to the length of sentence that the petitioner 
should serve does not exceed the maximum sentence set by law it is 
presumptively valid and will not be considered arbitrary or 
capricious absent unusual circumstances, which are not present in 
the instant action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT - WHICH SHOULD THEREFORE BE 
ASSUMED SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD 
Glasscock makes no statement of facts in his opening brief. 
He does not marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's 
Findings of Facts. Petitioner does not seek to show in any manner 
that the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the 
trial court's Findings of Fact. For this reason, this Court should 
assume that the record supports the findings of the trial court. 
If a challenge is made to the findings, an 
appellant must marshal all evidence in favor 
of the facts as found by the trial court and 
then demonstrate that even viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact. If the 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court and 
proceeds to the review of the accuracy of the 
lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case. , 
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Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
The unchallenged findings of fact show that petitioner is 
serving a sentence of one-to-fifteen years and that the Board of 
Pardons has held two hearings concerning the eligibility of the 
petitioner for release on parole. R. 69-70. At the initial 
hearing, the Board identified the aggravating and mitigating 
factors that it considered, and determined not to set a parole date 
for Mr. Glasscock at that time, but rather to rehear the matter 
some two years later, and that an alienist report be prepared for 
the Board before that time. R. 54-56, 69-70. 
Because petitioner has not marshaled the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings of fact, and has not shown how the 
evidence of record is insufficient to support the trial court's 
factual findings, this Court should assume "that the record 
supports the findings of the trial court" and proceed "to the 
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law in the case." Saunders, 806 P.2d at 
199. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER 
THOSE ISSUES THAT THE PETITIONER RAISES FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Mr. Glasscock claims, for the first time on appeal, that 
Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme is unconstitutional as 
applied to him. In the trial court, Glasscock did not present this 
argument in any manner. 
In the trial court, Glasscock claimed that the Board of 
Pardons had no authority to give him a rehearing date, as opposed 
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to a parole date. R. 9. 
Glasscock also claimed that he "could not present evidence in 
his behalf or statements in mitigation because the Board would have 
held him in denial and if Board records were subpoenaed it would 
prove those who attempt to present statements in mitigation get 
held in denial." R. 5. In essence, this argument is that the 
Board of Pardons, because it looks with disfavor upon inmates who 
continue to deny responsibility for the actions that led to their 
incarceration, intimidated petitioner from making his own claims to 
the Board that he was innocent and that he, Glasscock, did not 
commit the sexual abuse of a child to which he actually pled guilty 
and for which he is currently incarcerated. R. 5-8. 
Petitioner claimed that he should have been afforded counsel 
at the original parole hearing.1 R. 7. 
Mr. Glasscock also claimed that the Utah Board of Pardons 
erred in not following the guidelines in his case. R. 9. 
Finally, Mr. Glasscock claimed that the class of sex offenders 
was a "suspect classification" and that he had been treated 
unfairly because of his status as a sex offender.2 R. 10. At no 
1
 This issue has not been raised on appeal. Even if it were 
raised, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly rejected the claim that 
an inmate is entitled to the assistance of counsel in an initial 
parole grant hearing in Neel v. Holden. 886 P.2d 1097, 1103-4 (Utah 
1994) . 
2
 But petitioner failed to make any showing in the trial 
court in support of his claim that sex offenders were receiving 
longer periods of incarceration than other offenders. Given 
petitioner's failure to support this claim in any manner, this 
court should refuse to consider this matter further. This claim 
was not pursued before the trial court. 
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time did petitioner raise the claim that Utah's indeterminate 
sentencing scheme was unconstitutional before the trial court. 
In Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 
1990), the plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim for the first 
time on appeal. In refusing to consider that claim, the Utah 
Supreme Court explained: 
Appellants' first claim is that the 
realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the 
liberty to control their children's education. 
This claim was raised for the first time on 
appeal. With limited exceptions, the practice 
of this Court has been to decline 
consideration of issues raised for the first 
time on appeal. We therefore do not address 
this claim. 
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this 
general rule referred to in Espinal deal with cases in which the 
appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed plain 
error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. 
Seoulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992) (footnote 
omitted). See also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992) ; 
State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). 
It was the duty of the petitioner to raise any and all claims 
against the respondent Board of Pardons in the trial court. 
Glasscock's claim that the indeterminate sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional was not raised in the trial court. Further, 
Glasscock has not briefed the question of whether plain error or 
other exceptional circumstances might exist that could lead this 
Court to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Where 
the petitioner has not analyzed an issue in his opening brief, this 
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Court will not review that issue. Brown, 853 P.2d at 854 n.l. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE UTAH STATE BOARD OF 
PARDONS AND PAROLE CONCERNING DAVID W. 
GLASSCOCK HAS NOT VIOLATED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER 
In Malek v. Sawava. 730 P.2d 629, 630 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court made it clear that an extraordinary writ is "not an 
available remedy in the absence of a claim of fundamental 
unfairness at trial or a substantial and prejudicial denial of 
constitutional rights." The trial court correctly determined that 
petitioner had failed to present such a claim, 
A. The Board's decisions concerning Glasscock's parole status were 
neither arbitrary nor capricious. The Board is not bound by the 
sentencing guidelines and is free to set petitioner's period of 
incarceration as it sees fit so long as the time served falls 
within the applicable indeterminate range. 
Glasscock's claims concerning the Board of Pardons' decision 
to give petitioner a rehearing date instead of a parole date 
demonstrate a misunderstanding of Utah law. Petitioner does not 
seem to understand that he is still serving a one-to-fifteen year 
sentence and that the Utah Board of Pardons has discretion to 
require him to serve any or all of that sentence. Preece v. House, 
886 P.2d 508, 511-12 (Utah 1994). The Board is not required to 
conform to the sentencing guidelines. I&. Utah's sentencing 
guidelines "used by the board of pardons do not have the force and 
effect of law." Id; see also. Hall v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 806 
P.2d 217, 218 (Utah App. 1991). Absent some other constitutional 
infirmity, the courts do not sit as a panel of review on the 
Board's function. Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 
947 (Utah 1994) . "So long as the period of incarceration decided 
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upon by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable 
indeterminate range . . . then that decision, absent unusual 
circumstances, cannot be arbitrary and capricious." Preece, 886 
P.2d at 512. 
The very claim made by Mr. Glasscock was rejected by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Lancaster. As in the instant action, Lancaster 
involved an inmate's challenge to a rehearing date that he had been 
given in lieu of a parole date. 
He also challenges the Board's failure to fix 
the exact number of years he would serve on 
his indeterminate sentence, . . . None of 
these claims describe a due process violation 
reviewable under Foote or Labrum. 
869 P.2d at 947. There is nothing improper or unlawful about the 
Board of Pardons practice of refusing to set parole dates for those 
inmates that the Board, in its judgment, feels should not be 
released on parole. Indeed the statute governing initial parole 
grant hearings expressly authorizes the Board to give a rehearing 
date instead of a parole date. Utah Code § 77-27-7 (1994). 
The trial court correctly dismissed petitioner's challenge to 
the Board of Pardon's decision concerning the length of time that 
petitioner must serve before he will be placed on parole. There is 
nothing arbitrary and capricious about the board's decision to not 
permit the petitioner parole. The Board of Pardons power to set a 
parole date includes the authority to deny a parole date. The 
Board has the power to determine that an inmate should serve his 
maximum sentence. 
At best, the petitioner can only claim that this is what a 
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rehearing date is. The only argument petitioner could make is that 
the rehearing date simply indicates that the Board is not inclined 
to believe that the prisoner should receive a parole date at that 
time, but that the decision will be reconsidered on a date certain. 
This is well within the authority of the Board to do. Petitioner 
has no right to parole. Glasscock has no right to a particular 
parole date. The Board of Pardons decision not to set a parole 
date for Mr. Glasscock did not violate any right of the petitioner. 
The Board of Pardons informed petitioner of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances that had been considered in reaching 
its decision. R. 55. Petitioner has never claimed that he was not 
given access to the materials considered by the Board in reaching 
their decision. Given these circumstances, the trial court 
correctly dismissed this petition and that decision should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
B. The fact that the Board of Pardons might not believe the 
petitioner's claims of innocence did not work a substantial and 
prejudicial denial of the constitutional rights of Mr. Glasscock. 
Mr. Glasscock claims that he was, by his own fears and not the 
actions of the Board of Pardons, precluded from presenting 
mitigating evidence before the Board of Pardons which would have 
shown that Mr. Glasscock was not guilty of the crime he pled guilty 
too and that the guilty plea was invalid. Petitioner does not 
claim that the Board would not permit him to present this evidence, 
but rather that he feared that the Board would not believe his 
claim that he was innocent of the crime to which he had pleaded 
guilty. Petitioner feared that, if the Board did not believe his 
11 
protestations of innocence, the Board would consider the petitioner 
to be denying his responsibility for his criminal wrongdoing and 
therefore be a poor risk for parole. 
Mr. Glasscock's claim was properly rejected by the trial 
court. Petitioner did not raise this issue before the Board of 
Pardons and could not raise it, or litigate it, for the first time 
in the subsequent extraordinary writ proceeding. Brinkerhoff v. 
Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah App. 1990). 
The fact that the Board of Pardons may not believe an inmate's 
protestations of innocence (especially where the inmate has pled 
guilty to the charge and has not sought to have that guilty plea 
set aside) does not create a substantial and prejudicial denial of 
the inmate's constitutional rights. This is especially so when, as 
here, the inmate did not actually present his evidence to the Board 
but asks this Court to presume what the Board's reaction to that 
evidence would have been. This Court should not make such a 
presumption that the Board, in a hypothetical situation that has 
not occurred, would violate the constitutional rights of 
petitioner. 
Indeed, the claims made by the petitioner are not actually 
mitigating circumstances that would influence the Board's decision 
concerning a parole date for Mr. Glasscock. Rather than factors 
that would influence the Board to believe that petitioner has 
served sufficiently his sentence and is now ready to be placed on 
parole, the petitioner's allegations instead address the issue of 
whether or not petitioner is lawfully incarcerated in the first 
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place. The claims of improprieties in the taking of his plea of 
guilty would be more appropriately raised by the petitioner in a 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and an extraordinary writ 
proceeding pursuant to Rule 65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The only involvement of the Board of Pardons and Parole in 
such claims would be in considering an application for a pardon, 
not as mitigating factors in a parole hearing. 
The trial court correctly held that a parole grant hearing is 
not the proper forum for the petitioner to challenge his underlying 
conviction. The trial court correctly dismissed the instant 
petition and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Glasscock's petition 
for an extraordinary writ and its decision should therefore be 
affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION NOT 
REQUESTED BY THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE 
The State of Utah's Board of Pardons does not request oral 
argument and a published opinion in this matter. Petitioner's 
claims are contrary to clearly established law and the issues 
presented have been previously resolved by the Courts of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted this *Z&^ day of May, 1995. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee 
s$msrz^4/ 
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CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent-Appellee State of Utah, postage 
prepaid, to the following on this the of May, 1995: 
David W. Glasscock 
Inmate No. 18886 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
& 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
MARTHA S. STONEBROOK (5149) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Respondents 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 575-1600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
David Wayne Glasscock, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Board of Pardons, 
Respondents. 
Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Order 
Case No. 940902334 EC 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
The hearing on the Petition for Extraordinary Relief filed by 
David Wayne Glasscock came before this Court and was heard on 
November 18, 1994 at 10:30 a.m.. Petitioner appeared pro se. 
Martha S. Stonebrook, Assistant Attorney General, appeared on 
behalf of the Utah State Board of Pardons (hereinafter "the 
Board"). Based upon the pleadings filed in this matter, the 
arguments of the parties, and for good cause shown thereon, this 
Court issues the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Order: 
ra^KFTFST COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 0 2 1994 
0 0 0 0 6 S 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 29, 1991, petitioner entered a plea of 
guilty to the offense of sexual abuse of a child and was sentenced 
by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to serve not less than one year 
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
2. Petitioner's sentence and conviction have not been 
reversed or vacated of appeal. 
3. On June 24, 1992, the Board held petitioner's original 
parole grant hearing at which time the Board set a rehearing date 
of November, 1994. 
4. On June 24, 1992, the Board entered its rationale for its 
decision which weighed the aggravating circumstances against the 
mitigating circumstances and determined that an alienist report 
would be due prior to the rehearing date. 
5. On February 14, 1994, the Board responded to inquiries 
made by petitioner as to the reasons for its decision of June 24, 
1992. 
6. The Board, in part, justified its decision on the victim's 
age and the violent nature of the offense, petitioner's relation-
ship to the victim, his denial of the offense, and the lack of sex 
therapy while at the Utah State Prison. The Board also questioned 
family support and petitioner's prior arrest conviction and 
supervision history. 
a 
-000069 
7. A rehearing was held on November 4, 1994 to consider 
whether petitioner should be granted a parole date. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Board took the matter under 
advisement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This court does not have jurisdiction over nor does it 
have the power to control the Board. 
2. The Board has complete discretion in determining when a 
prisoner will be released. 
3. Petitioner does not have a protected interest in nor an 
expectation of parole. 
4. The Utah sentencing guidelines and matrix are not 
mandatory and are not binding on the Board. 
5. The parole hearing is not the proper forum in which to 
reargue petitioner's case. 
6. In this matter, all elements of due process have been 
met. 
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ORDER 
Now, wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the relief 
requested in respondent's Memorandum in Opposition is granted and 
petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is denied and 
dismissed with prejudice. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Pat B. 
District Court Judg 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the <£$> day of 
November, 1994, a true and correct copy of the foregoing unsigned 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER was mailed, 
first-class postage to: 
David Wayne Glasscock #18886 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code § 77-27-7 Parole or hearing dates - Interview -
Hearings - Report of alienists - Mental competency. 
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine within six 
months after the date of an offender's commitment to the custody of 
the Department of Corrections, for serving a sentence upon 
conviction of a felony or class A misdemeanor offense, a date upon 
which the offender shall be afforded a hearing to establish a date 
of release or a date for a rehearing, and shall promptly notify the 
offender of the date. 
R671-201-1. Schedule and Notice. 
Within six months of an offender's commitment to prison the 
Board will give notice of the month and year in which the inmate's 
original hearing will be conducted. A minimum of one week (7 
calendar days) prior notice should be given regarding the specific 
day and approximate time of such hearing. 
An inmate who is serving up to a life sentence will be 
eligible for a hearing after the service of three years. 
An inmate who is serving a sentence of up to fifteen years 
will be eligible for a hearing after the service of nine months. 
An inmate who is serving a sentence of up to five years 
including Class A Misdemeanor commitments will be eligible for a 
hearing after the service of ninety days. 
Excluded from the above provisions are inmates who are 
sentenced to death. 
An inmate may petition the Board to calendar him/her at a time 
other than the usual times designated above or the Board may do so 
on its own motion. A petition by the inmate shall set out the 
exigencies which give rise to the request. The Board shall notify 
the petitioner of its decision in writing as soon as possible. 
